Since the 1979 overthrow of the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Islamic Republic of Iran has had a fractious relationship with other countries in the middle east. Twenty-seven years on, the idea that Iran under its hardline president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may be seeking nuclear weapons will only be viewed with suspicion by Arab governments across the region.
For numerous reasons, Tehran has the power to unnerve its neighbours. The concept of a republic – in which figures such as supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Ahmadinejad himself assume power on merit or by popular vote – is alien to the potentates and hereditary rulers in countries where elections either are not held or are not contested: Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states.
When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei’s revolution threatened to export his brand of Islamic republicanism to the rest of the middle east, Iran became public enemy number one. The fact that Khomenei’s was a Shi’a-based ideology would have particularly irked the Saudi royal family, given their symbiotic relationship over the years with Sunni ideologues and the national adherence to Wahhabism, the brand of Islam taught by the 18th century preacher Mohammad ibn Abdulwahhab. When Saddam Hussein launched his “whirlwind war” against Iran in 1980, therefore, Iraq’s doomed endeavour was supported by many governments in the region.
Those ruling families saw direct threats to their own authority in events such as the Iraqi-based, Iranian-backed group al-Dawa’s 1985 assassination attempt on the emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, and riots by Iranian pilgrims in Mecca during the 1987 hajj. It is no surprise that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were the two largest providers of aid to Iraq during its tortuous 1980-88 war with Iran.
Robert Fisk’s The Great War for Civilization: The Conquest of the Middle East details how Saudi Arabia presented Iraq with a $25-billion breakdown of the financial support it gave to Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war. Kuwait still remembers its oil tankers and refineries being subjected to Iranian missile attacks after Iraq began the “tanker war” in the Gulf, when both sides targeted oil exports from the region.
The Shi’a factor
Despite the easing of Arab-Iranian relations in the 1990s, there are still those in the Arab world who believe that Iran is not yet finished “exporting” the revolution; and the sultans, emirs and kings of the Gulf will only feel more vulnerable if Iran has a nuclear device to back up its foreign-policy objectives. Thus, whatever international or American action is taken to stop Iran from “going nuclear” will definitely receive support in the region.
While the idea of a limited, conventional United States military strike against Iran’s nuclear assets would not be completely anathema to some governments, however, they know that the economic and security fallout from such a move would not be in their best interests. Most people in the middle east do not want military action taken against Iran, but are afraid that their governments are powerless to have any real say on the issue, in light of the overwhelming American influence in the region. Given the precarious security situation in Iraq at present, though, many people believe that US threats of military action against Iran are hollow.
Rattled by Iran’s republicanism, Arab governments also fear Tehran’s ability to speak directly to Shi’a minorities and other disenfranchised groups. Traditionally, the Shi’a have had to be content with a back seat in Gulf politics. That situation has undergone some serious revision since Saddam’s downfall, however. With Shi’a now in government in Iraq, Shi’a groups that traditionally avoided the political spotlight in neighbouring states are becoming less reticent about entering the public sphere. Arab rulers know that such groups can only be emboldened by a more regionally powerful Iran.
Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak weighed in on the issue recently, provoking outrage when he questioned the loyalty of followers of the Shi’a faith to their homelands. “There are Shi’a in all these countries, significant percentages, and Shi’a are mostly always loyal to Iran and not the country where they live,” he said in an interview with Al-Arabiya, the Dubai-based, Saudi-owned news channel.
Such religious differences between Shi’a Iran and the predominantly Sunni Arab world will always be seen by some commentators as the defining element of their relationship. However, history has shown – in places as far afield as Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia – that sectarian conflict is usually a symptom of a deeper, more political struggle.
Sectarian difference will always be the default setting for extremists across the middle east, whenever they want to fan the flames of political conflict between the Arab and Persian worlds. But countries such as Kuwait are trying to ensure that religious differences do not become the defining element. Recently, a number of books by Saudi Sunni clerics were banned from an Islamic book fair in Kuwait, on the ground that they might foster sectarian tension.
The Arab dilemma
However, if there is to be increased rapprochement between Arab nations and Iran, a number of shifts will have to be made to promote better relations. Regional organisations such as the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – both often derided as ineffectual – could open up communication channels with Tehran. By opening negotiations at such a level, the smaller Arab states would be able to approach such talks on a more equal footing.
Also, Iran still has ongoing territorial disputes with some of its neighbours, in particular its presence on a number of islands claimed by the United Arab Emirates. If Tehran were prepared to settle such issues, fears of Iranian expansionism could be assuaged somewhat.
Presently, the golden rule seems to be that the nearer a country is to Iran, the more diplomatic their choice of words when addressing the Iran’s nuclear program. At the latest GCC meeting in Riyadh, the organisation expressed its wish to see the region free of all weapons of mass destruction; yet, it remained diplomatic about how such a policy might be best achieved.
Other than offering diplomatic platitudes, there have been no concrete proposals from Arab governments toward finding a resolution, other than calls that Iran should comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations. It is highly unlikely that Arab countries are ready to take on an active role in the peacemaking process between Iran and the US. Many of these smaller countries, like Qatar and Bahrain, are nervous about getting caught in the crossfire of an Iran-US conflict.
Governments in the region do not have a good record at mediating peaceful solutions to regional issues, and they tend to be reactive rather than proactive when crisis looms on the horizon, such as before the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq. It will take a monumental change in their collective point of view if they are to take on the role of peacemaker between Washington and Tehran.
If multilateral relations are to improve – the nuclear issue aside – Iran would have to stop “interfering” in the internal affairs of her neighbours. Kuwait formally complained to Tehran in the past when visiting Iranian diplomats met with Kuwaiti Shi’a political leaders. However, Iran’s considerable clout in a weakening Iraq seems set only to increase.
Haila Al-Mekaimi, the head of the Euro-Gulf Research Centre at Kuwait University believes that the region is returning to the “arms race” of the 1980s. “Wasting money on armaments has negatively affected development in the region,” she says. The Gulf states would like to see Iran take a more active role in such areas as regional economic development. Al-Mekaimi insisted that if Iran were to concentrate on internal, rather than regional issues, this would be one small step towards normalising relations. But taking that step would require a dramatic change of outlook in Tehran.
Al-Mekaimi remarks of Iran’s stagnant economy (albeit one boosted currently by enormous reveneues from high oil prices): “As a model to follow, it has failed the test.” She labelled Iran’s present strategy as antiquated in its failure to embrace the needs of the 21st century, adding: “Iran is still pursuing the dream of being an [old-fashioned] regional military power, regardless of the consequences.”
Al-Mekaimi believes that an economically vibrant Iran would be a more welcomed presence in the middle east than one armed with nuclear weapons. “Iran needs to boost its own economy,” she says. “They are not helping themselves. Their priorities are upside down. Nowadays it is your economy that makes you influential. This kind of military power (that Iran is pursuing) has limits.” Reflecting on Iran’s current relationship with her neighbours, Al-Mekaimi cites an Arabic proverb: “If you don’t have anything, what can you offer anyone else?”
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