Raymond Barrett

Sunday Business Post
By Raymond Barrett

An increase in violence across Afghanistan has ignited debate over what the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) can realistically hope to achieve in the war-torn country.

At least 17 people were killed in the capital Kabul last Thursday in a suicide bombing claimed by the Taliban. Casualties among US soldiers and Afghan security forces have also spiked in recent weeks.

Though the senior Nato commander supports a more expansive ‘nation building’ option involving up to 40,000 more troops, US president Barack Obama appears to favour a more targeted approach focusing on the al-Qaeda infrastructure.

The ISAF was initially conceived to provide security to the interim Afghan government after the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. It now comprises nearly 70,000 soldiers from 24 countries, spread thinly across the country.

Increasingly, these troops have been drawn away from reconstruction work and into combat, often without the necessary resources. British marines in the southern Helmand province have complained about a lack of helicopters and armoured vehicles.

Regardless of which strategy is ultimately chosen, there seems little likelihood of the Taliban disappearing. It is clearly resurgent despite continued losses – Nato claimed that more than 100 militants were killed in combat over the last two weeks.

This may account for a possible shift in US strategy: negotiating a deal with Taliban elements willing to break away from al-Qaeda. There is also concern in Washington over Afghan president Hamid Karzai, whose legitimacy has been damaged by accusations of electoral fraud.

Then there is the thorny issue of the readiness and loyalty of the Afghan army, who were expected to assume a more prominent role in a post-Taliban state.

Tom A Peter, an American journalist currently embedded with the US military in the Paktika province, described to The Sunday Business Post the continuing gap between these expectations and the reality on the ground. ‘‘All the attitudes that US soldiers had towards their Iraqi counterparts – questionable allegiances and marginal abilities – carry over to Afghanistan’s security forces. Of course soldiers say there are good units and bad units, but, generally speaking, an Afghan unit really has to prove itself in order to win the trust of the average US soldier,” he said.

The reluctance of the Obama administration to deploy a large number of new troops is also influenced by another key factor – Pakistan.

In response to recent Taliban attacks, the US launched air strikes on Taliban positions in Pakistan’s federally-administered tribal areas – which have become a key operational base for al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders.

Committing more personnel and resources to Afghanistan, when Washington’s number one priority lies across the border in Pakistan, appears to have found little support in the White House.

However, pursuing a ‘Pak-Af’ strategy raises other awkward questions.

Ultimately, will the US military have to defy the Pakistani government and deploy significant ground forces inside Pakistan to defeat al-Qaeda and its allies in the Taliban, or can better intelligence and air strikes (and the inevitable civilian casualties they entail) succeed, despite having failed over the last eight years?

Ashley J Tellis, a defence specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, believes it is unlikely that the US will ever put significant numbers of ground troops inside Pakistani territory, even though US special forces have crossed the border in the past.

‘‘The US cannot put boots on the ground in Pakistan – whether it is targeting the Pakistani Taliban, alQaeda or the Afghan Taliban leadership. It will have to be done by standoff attacks,” Tellis told The Sunday Business Post this week.

The recent announcement of an annual $1.5 billion aid package to Islamabad – with the proviso that the government exercise ‘‘effective civilian control over the military’’ – indicates that US patience with the current situation inside Pakistan may not be infinite.